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THE OPEN SOCIETY 
AND ITS ENEMIES 
THE SPELL OF PLATO 


THE OPEN SOCIETY 
AND ITS ENEMIES 

by K. R. POPPER 


Volume I 

THE SPELL OF PLATO 


London 

GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS, LTD. 

BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.G. 


First published 
Reprinted 1947 


It will be seen . . , that the Erewhonians 
are a meek and long-suffering people, easily led 
by the nose, and quick to offer up common 
sense . . . when a philosopher arises among 
them . . . SAMUEL BUTLER. 



THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN COMPLETE 
CONFORMITY WITH THE AUTHORIZED 
ECONOMY STANDARDS 


tinted in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London 


PREFACE 

If in this book harsh words are spoken about some of the 
greatest among the intellectual leaders of mankind, my motive 
is not, I hope, the wish to belittle them. It springs rather from 
my conviction that if we wish our civilization to survive we must 
break with the habit of deference to great men. Great men 
may make great mistakes ; and as the book tries to show, some 
of the greatest leaders of the past supported the perennial attack 
on freedom and reason. Their influence, too rarely challenged, 
continues to mislead those on whose defence civilization depends, 
and to divide them. The responsibility for this tragic and 
possibly fatal division becomes ours if we hesitate to be outspoken 
in our criticism of what admittedly is part of our intellectual 
heritage. By our reluctance to criticize a part of it, we may 
help to destroy it all. 

The book is a critical introduction to the philosophy of 
politics and of history, and an examination of some of the 
principles of social reconstruction. Its aim and the line of 
approach are indicated in the Introduction. Even where it looks 
back into the past, its problems are the problems of our own 
time ; and I have tried hard to make it as simple as possible, 
hoping to clarify matters which concern us all. 

Although the book presupposes nothing but open-mindedness 
in the reader, its object is not so much to popularize the questions 
treated as to solve them. In order to serve this double purpose, 
all matters of more specialized interest have been confined to 
the notes collected at the end of the book. 


ACKNO WLEDGEMENTS 

I wish to express my gratitude to all my friends who have 
made it possible for me to write this book. Mr. C. G. F. Simkin 
has not only helped me with an earlier version, but has given 
me the opportunity of clarifying many problems in detailed 
discussions over a period of nearly four years. Miss Margaret 
Dalziel has assisted me in the preparation of various drafts and 
of the final manuscript. Her untiring help has been invaluable. 
Mr. H. Larsen's interest in the problem of historicism was a 



great encouragement. Mr. T. K. Ewer has read the manuscript 
and has made many suggestions for its improvement. Miss 
Helen Hervey has put a great deal of work into the compilation 
of the Index. 

I am deeply indebted to Professor F. A. von Hayek. Without 
his interest and support the book would not have been published. 
Dr. E. Gombrich has undertaken to see the book through the 
press, a burden to which was added the strain of an exacting 
correspondence between England and New Zealand. He has 
been so helpful that I can hardly say how much I owe to him. 

K. R. P. 

CHRISTCHURCH, 

April 1944. 


CONTENTS 

VOLUME I: THE SPELL OF PLATO 
PAOB 

PREFACE v 


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi 

INTRODUCTION i 

THE SPELL OF PLATO 5 


THE MYTH OF ORIGIN AND DESTINY 5 

Chapter i. Historicism and the Myth of Destiny ... 5 

Chapter 2. Heraclitus 9 

Chapter 3. Plato's Theory of Ideas 15 

PLATO'S DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY 29 

Chapter 4. Change and Rest -29 

Chapter 5. Nature and Convention 49 

PLATO'S POLITICAL PROGRAMME ..> 74 

Chapter 6. Totalitarian Justice 74 

Chapter 7. The Principle of Leadership 106 

Chapter 8. The Philosopher King 121 



Chapter 9. A Estheticism, Radicalism, Utopianism . . .138 


PLATO ATTACKS 149 

Chapter 10. The Open Society and its Enemies .... 149 
NOTES 178 


THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 
INTRODUCTION 

Concerning metaphysics . . , I admit that my 
formulations may here or there have been insuffi- 
ciently conditional and cautious. Yet I do not 
wish to hide the fact that I can only look with 
repugnance . . upon the puffed-up pretentious- 
ness of all these volumes filled with wisdom, such 
as are fashionable nowadays. For I am fully 
satisfied that . . the accepted methods must end- 
lessly increase these follies and blunders, and 
that even the complete annihilation of all these 
fanciful achievements could not possibly be as 
harmful as this fictitious science with its accursed 
fertility. 

KANT. 

This book raises a number of issues which may not be apparent 
from the table of contents. 

It sketches some of the difficulties faced by a civilization 
which aims at humaneness and reasonableness, at. equality and 
freedom ; a civilization which is still in its infancy, and which 
continues to grow in spite of the fact that it has been betrayed 
by so many of the intellectual leaders of mankind. It attempts | 
to show that this civilization has not yet fully recovered from 
the shock of its birth, the transition from the tribal or * closedl 
society ', with its submission to magical forces, to the * open 
society ' which sets free the critical powers of man. It attempts 
to show that the shock of this transition is one of the factors that 
have made possible the rise of those reactionary movements 
which have tried, and still try, to overthrow civilization and to 
return to tribalism. And it suggests that what we call nowadays 
totalitarianism belongs to these movements, which are just as 
old or just as young as our civilization itself. 

It tries thereby to contribute to our understanding of totali- 
tarianism, andofthe significance of the perennial Jjght againstjt. 

It furthertries to examine the application of the critical and 



rational methods of science to the problems of the open society. 

It analyses the principles of democratic social reconstruction, the 
principles of what I may term * piecemen.1 Social engineering * in 
opposition to c Utopian social engineering ' (as explained in 
Chapter g). t And it tries to clear away some of the obstacles 

i 


2 INTRODUCTION 

impeding a rational approach to the problems of social recon- 
struction. It does so by criticizing those social philosophies which 
are responsible for the widespread prejudice against the pos- 
sibilities jrf democratic reform. The most powerful of these 
reactionary philosophies Ts~ one whicR I have called historicism. 

The story of the rise and influence of some important forms of 
historicism is one of the main topics of the book, which might 
even be described as a collection of marginal notes on the develop- 
ment of certain historicist philosophies. A few remarks on the 
origin of the book will indicate what is meant by historicism and 
how it is connected with the other issues mentioned. 

Although my main interests are the methods of physics (and 
consequently certain technical problems which are far removed 
from those treated in this book), I have also been interested for 
many years in the problem of the backwardness of the social 
sciences. This is, of course, nothing but the problem of their 
method. My interest in this problem was greatly stimulated by 
the rise of totalitarianism, and by the failure of the various socia 
sciences and social philosophies to make sense of it. 

In this connection, one point appeared to me particularly urgent. 

Too often we hear it suggested that some form or other of 
totalitarianism is inevitable. Many who because of their ii A elli;- 
gence A and[ traimng _shoulc A be held responsible for what they 
say, announce that there is no escape from it. They ask us 
whether we are really naive enough to believe that democracy 
can be permanent ; whether we do not see that it is just one of 
the many forms of government that come and go in the course 
of history. They argue that democracy, in order to fight 
totalitarianism, is forced to copy its methods and thus to become 
totalitarian itself. Or they assert that our industrial system 
cannot continue to function without adopting the methods of 
collectivist planning, and they infer from the inevitability of a 
collectivist economic system that the adoption of totalitarian 
forms of social life is also inevitable. 

Such arguments may sound plausible enough. But plausi- 
bility is not a reliable guide in such matters. In fact, one should 
not enter into a discussion of these specious arguments before! 



having considered the following question of method : Is it within 
the power of any social science to make such sweeping historical 
prophecies ? Can we texpect to get more than the irresponsible! 
reply of the soothsayer if we ask a man what the future has in 
store for mankind ? 


INTRODUCTION 3 

This is a question of the method of the social sciences. It is 
clearly more fundamental than any debate on any particular 
argument offered in support of any historical prophecy. 

A careful examination of this question has led me to the 
conviction that such sweeping historical prophecies are entirely 
beyond the scope of scientific method. The future depends on 
ourselves, and we do not depend on any historical necessity. 

There are, however, influential social philosophies which hold 
the opposite view. They claim that everybody tries to use his 
brains to predict impending events ; that it is certainly legitimate 
for a strategist to try to foresee the outcome of a battle ; and 
that the boundaries between such a prediction and more sweeping 
historical prophecies are fluid. They maintain that it is the 
task of science in general to make predictions, or rather, to 
improve .upon our everyday predictions, and to put them upon a 
more secure basis ; and that it is the task of the social sciences 
in particular to furnish us with long-term historical prophecies. 

They also believe that they have discovered laws of history which 
enable them to prophesy the course of historical events. The 
various social philosophies which raise claims of this kind, I have 
grouped together under the name historicism. Elsewhere, in 
The Poverty of Historicism (Economic A 1944/45), I have tried to 
argue against these claims, and to show that in spite of their 
glausibilitY A thgy A arc A based A - jpnu- A L gross j A jsirnJgr f stanH A ng. jrf 
scientific 7 ^ method. While engaged in the systematic analysis 
ancTcriticism of thejiain A I tried as well to 

collect some material to illustrate its development. The notes 
collected for that purpose constitute the main part of this book. 

The systematic analysis of historicism aims at something like 
scientific status. This book does not. Many of the opinions 
expressed are personal. What it owes to scientific method is 
largely the awareness of its limitations : it does not offer proofs 
where nothing can be proved, nor does it pretend to be scientific 
where it cannot give more than a personal point of view. It does 
not tryjaj -eplace the old systems of philosophy by a new system. 
iTdoes not try to add to all these volumes A fille A T with wisdom, 
to the metaphysics of history and destiny, such as are fashion- 
able nowadays. It rather tries tojhow that this propheticjmsdom 
is harmful, that the rr A et A hysi AA histgr j r impede the applica- 
tion~ot the "piecein< [alj A sojcjal 



reformr A Xn3T It furtheFlnes to show how we may become the 
niaEers of our fate when we have ceased To pose asTtsTprophets . 


4 INTRODUCTION 

In tracing the development of historicism, I found that the 
dangerous liabit A of hutorical prophecy, so widespread among our 
intellectual leaders, has various A functions. It is always flattering 
to belong to the inner circle of the initiated, and to possess the 
unusual power of predicting the course of history. Besides, there 
is a tradition that intellectual leaders are giftejd with such powers, 
and not to possess them may~Ieadjto lpss . x>f_a&te . The danger, 
on the other hahd7 of their being unmasked as charlatans is very 
small, since they can always point out that it is certainly per- 
missible to make less sweeping predictions ; and the boundaries 
between these and augury are fluid. 

But there are sometimes further motives for holding historicist 
beliefs. The prophets who announce that certain events are 
bound to happen make propaganda for them, and help to bring 
them about. Their stcu AA a A emocracy A is nqtjq last for ever 
is as Jtrue, and as little to the point, as the assertion that human 
reason Is not to last for ever, since only democracy provides an 
institutional framework that permits reform without violence, 
and so the use of reason in political matters. But their story 
te A ids_tc A discpurage those A who fight totalitarianism ; its motive 
is to support the revolt A against A ivilizatibn . A further motive, 
it seems, can~6e found if we consider that historicist metaphysics 
are apt to relieve men from the strain of their responsibilities. 

If you know that things are bbund to happen whatever you do, 
then you may feel free to give up the fight against them. Th 
tendency of historicism to support the revolt against civilization 
may be due to the fact that it is itself largely a reaction against 
the strain of our civilization, and its demand for personal 
responsibility. 

These last allusions are somewhat vague, but they must suffice 
for an introduction. They will later be substantiated by historical 
material, especially in the chapter ' The Open Society and Its 
Enemies ' . I was tempted to place this chapter at the beginning 
of the book ; with its topicaj interest, it would certainly have 
made a more inviting introduction. But I found that the full 
weight of this historical interpretation cannot be felt unless 
it is preceded by the material discussed earlier in the book. It 
seems that one has first to be disturbed by the identity of the 
Platonic theory of justice with the theory, and j A rajctice of .modern 
totaHtar A how urgent it is to interpret 


these matters. 



THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 


VOL. I 

THE SPELL OF PLATO 

For the Open Society (about 430 B.C.) : 

Although only a few may originate a policy, 
we are all able to judge it. 

PERICLES OF ATHENS. 

Against the Open Society (about 80 years later) : 

The greatest principle of all is that nobody, 
whether male or female, should be without 
a leader. Nor should the mind of anybody 
be habituated to letting him do anything at 
all on his own initiative ; neither out of zeal, 
nor even playfully. But in war as well as in 
the midst of peace to his leader he shall 
direct his eye and follow him faithfully. And 
even in the smallest matter he should stand 
under leadership. For example, he should 
get up, or move, or wash, or take his meals 
. . only if he has been told to do so . . In 
a word, he should teach his soul, by long 
habit, never to dream of acting independently, 
and in fact, to become utterly incapable of it. 
PLATO OF ATHENS. 


THE MYTH OF DESTINY 


CHAPTER 1 : HISTORICISM AND THE MYTH OF 
DESTINY 


It is widely believed that a truly scientific and philosophical 
attitude towards politics, and a deeper understanding of social 
life in general, must be based upon a contemplation and intei 
pretation of human history. While the ordinary man takes the 
setting of his life and the importance of hi$ personal experiences 
and struggles for granted, it is said that the social scientist or 
philosopher has to survey things from a higher plane. He sees 
the individual as a pawn, as a rather insignificant instrument in 



THE MYTH OF DESTINY 


the general development of mankind. And the really important! 
actors on the Stage of History he may find, perhaps, in th< 

Great Nations and their Great Leaders, or perhaps in the Grea 
Classes, or in the Great Ideas. However this may be, he will ti 
to understand the meaning of the play which is performed on 
that Stage ; he will try to understand the laws of historical 
development. If he succeeds in this, he will, of course, be able 
to predict future developments. He might then put politics upon 
a solid basis, and give us practical advice by telling us which 
political actions are likely to succeed or likely to fail. 

This is a brief description of an attitude which I call historicism. 
It is an old idea, or rather, a connected set of ideas which 
unfortunately have become so much a part of our spiritual 
atmosphere that they are usually taken for granted, and hardly, 
ever questioned. I have tried elsewhere to show that. JJie 
historicist approach to the social sciences gives gopr results. I 
have also tried to outline a method which, I believe, would yield 
better results. 

But if historicism is a faulty method that produces worthless 
results, then it may be useful to see how it originated, and how 
Succeeded in entrenching itself so successfully. A historical 
sketch undertaken with this aim can, at the same time, serve to 
analyse the variety of ideas which have gradually accumulated 
around the central historicist doctrine that history is controlled 
by developmental laws whose discovery would enable us to 
prophesy the destiny of man. 

Hjstoricism, which I have so far characterized only in a 
rather abstract way, can be well illustrated by one of the simplest 
and oldest of its forms, the doctrine of the chosen people. This 
doctrine is one of the attempts to make history understandable 
by a theistic interpretation, i.e. by recognizing God as the author 
of the play performed on the Historical Stage. The theory of 
the chosen people, more specifically, assumes that God has 
selected one people to function as the instrument of His will, 
and that this people will inherit the earth. 

In this doctrine, the law of historical development is laid 
down by the Will of God. This is the specific difference which 
distinguishes the theistic form from other forms of historicism. 

A naturalistic historicism, for instance, might treat the develop- 
mentaHaw as aJaw of nature ; a spiritual historicism would treat 
it as a law of spiritual development ; an ec 
aerain. as a law of economic development.