SummaTheologiae또는 SummaTheologica(번역.'신학 요약')는 종종 단순히Summa라고 불리며스콜라 신학자이자교회 박사인Thomas Aquinas(1225-1274)의 가장 잘 알려진 작품입니다. 그것은가톨릭 교회의모든 주요 신학적 가르침의개요이며, 신학생과 문맹 평신도를 포함한신학생들을위한 교육 지침서가되기위한 것입니다.서구에서기독교 신학의 거의 모든 요점에 대한 추론을 제시하면서Summa의 주제는 다음주기를 따릅니다 :하나님; 창조, 사람;인간의 목적;그리스도;성사; 그리고 하나님께로 돌아갑니다.
미완성이지만"철학사의 고전 중 하나이자 서양 문학의 가장 영향력있는 작품 중 하나"입니다.[1]더욱이숨마는 아퀴나스의 "가장 완벽한 작품, 그의 전 생애에 대한 생각이 응축된 성숙한 시절의 열매"로 남아 있습니다.[2]학자가 아닌 사람들 사이에서Summa는 아마도 "다섯 가지 방법"(라틴어:quinque viae)으로 알려진 신의 존재에 대한다섯 가지주장으로 가장 유명할 것입니다. 그러나 다섯 가지 방법은Summa의3,125개 기사 중 하나만 차지합니다.
Summa는 Aquinas의 초기Summa contra Gentiles의 보다 구조화되고 확장된 버전이지만 둘은 다른 목적으로 작성되었습니다.SummaTheologiae는 초보 신학생들에게 기독교 신앙을 설명하려고 한 반면,Summa contra Gentiles는 기독교 신앙을 설명하고 적대적인 상황에서 기독교 신앙을 옹호하기 위해 의도된 사용 상황에 맞게 조정된 논증으로 각 조항은 특정 신념이나 특정이단을 반박합니다.[3]
아퀴나스는Summa를 특히 초급 학생들에게 적합한 작품으로 생각했습니다.
Quia Catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provectos debet instruere, sed ad eum pertinet etiam incipientes erudire, secundum illud apostoli I ad Corinth. III, 크리스토의 탄콰 파르불리스, 락 보비스 포툼 데디, 논 에스캄; Propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est, EA quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium
가톨릭 진리의 의사는 능숙한 사람을 가르쳐야 할 뿐만 아니라 초보자도 가르쳐야 하기 때문입니다. 사도가 고린도전서 3:1-2에서 말했듯이, 그리스도 안에 있는 유아들에 관해서는, 나는 당신에게 고기가 아니라 마실 우유를 주었습니다, 이 작업에서 우리가 제안한 의도는 기독교와 관련된 것들을 초보자의 가르침에 적합한 방식으로 전달하는 것입니다.
—"프로오에미움",숨마 신학I, 1.
20세기에 성 토마스 아퀴나스 교황청 대학이 될 성 토마스 대학의 전신인산타 사비나스투디움 프로빈시알레(Santa Sabina studium provinciale)와 성 토마스 대학의 전신인 안젤리쿰에서 가르치는 동안 아퀴나스는숨마를 작곡하기 시작했습니다.그는프리마 파르스(Prima Pars, '첫 번째 부분') 전체를 완성하고 이탈리아에서 유포한 후파리 대학교(1269-1272)의 교수로서 두 번째 섭정을 맡기 위해 떠났습니다.[4]
Summa Theologiae는토미즘 철학의 주요 지적 영감 중 하나였을 뿐만 아니라 단테 알리기에리의신곡에도 큰 영향을 미쳐 단테의 서사시를 "운문의숨마"라고 불렀습니다.[5]오늘날에도 서방과 동방 가톨릭 교회와 주류 원래 개신교 교파(성공회와 성공회,루터교,감리교,장로교) 모두에서Summa Theologiae가디아코네이트나사제직서품을 원하는 사람들에게 주요 참고 자료가 되는 것이 매우 일반적입니다. , 또는 공언 된 남성 또는 여성의 종교 생활, 또는 대학 수준에서 철학과 신학을 공부하는 평신도를위한 것입니다.
질문은특정 토론 주제인 반면, 해당기사는상위 질문의 추가로 지정된 측면입니다. 예를 들어, 파트 I, 질문 2 ( "하나님의 존재")는 세 개의 기사로 나뉩니다 : (1) "하나님의 존재가 자명 한가?"; (2) "하나님이 존재한다는 것을 증명할 수 있는가?"; (3) "하나님이 존재하는가?" 또한 더 넓은 주제에 대한 질문은논문으로 그룹화되지만 논문의 범주는 출처에 따라 다르게 보고됩니다.
Summa의세 부분에는 몇 가지 다른 주요 세분화가 있습니다.
첫 번째 부분(Prima Pars, 119 QQ 포함, 584 기사 포함) : 하나님의 존재와 본성; 세상의 창조;천사;그리고 인간의 본성.
두번째 부분(303 QQ, 1536 기사 포함), 두 개의 하위 부분으로 세분화 :
두 번째 부분의 첫 번째 부분(Prima Secundae또는 파트 I-II, 114 QQ 포함, 619 기사 포함) : 도덕의 일반 원칙 (법이론 포함).
두 번째부분의 두 번째 부분(Secunda Secundae또는 파트 II-II; 189 QQ, 917 기사 포함) : 특히 개인의 미덕과 악덕을 포함한 도덕성.
세 번째 부분(Tertia Pars; 90 QQ 포함, 549 기사 포함) : 하나님의 사람의 길이 되신 그리스도의 인격과 사역; 그리고성례전. 아퀴나스는이 부분을 미완성으로 남겨 두었습니다.[6]
부록(99 QQ, 446 기사): 적절한 세 번째 부분에는 세 번째 부분과 기독교종말론또는 "마지막 것들"을 다루는Summa를 마무리하는 사후 보충이 수반됩니다.
부록 I(2 QQ, 8 기사 포함) 및부록 II(1 Q, 2 기사 포함) :연옥의 주제를 논의하는 두 개의 아주 작은 부록.
Summa의 파트 II는 두 부분 (PrimaSecundae와Secunda Secundae)으로 나뉩니다.첫 번째 부분은 114 개의 질문으로 구성되어 있고 두 번째 부분은 189 개의 질문으로 구성됩니다. 두 번째 부분의 두 부분은 일반적으로 여러 "논문"을 포함하는 것으로 제시됩니다. 내용은 다음과 같다:[9]
TheSummamakes many references to certain thinkers held in great respect in Aquinas's time. The arguments from authority, orsed contraarguments, are almost entirely based on citations from these authors. Some were called by special names:
The Apostle—Paul the Apostle: He wrote the majority of theNew Testamentcanon after his conversion, earning him the title of The Apostle in Aquinas'sSummaeven though Paul was not among the original twelve followers of Jesus.
The Philosopher—Aristotle: He was considered the most astute philosopher, the one who had expressed the most truth up to that time. The main aim of theScholastictheologians was to use his precise technical terms andlogical systemto investigate theology.
The Commentator—Averroes(Ibn Rushd): He was among the foremost commentators on Aristotle's works in Arabic, and his commentaries were often translated into Latin (along with Aristotle's text).
The Theologian—Augustine of Hippo: Considered the greatest theologian who had ever lived up to that time; Augustine's works are frequently quoted by Aquinas.
The JuristorThe Legal Expert(iurisperitus) —Ulpian(aRoman jurist): the most-quoted contributor to thePandects.
Tully—Marcus Tullius Cicero: famed Roman statesman and orator who was also responsible for bringing significant swathes of Greek philosophy to Latin-speaking audiences, though generally through summation and commentary in his own work rather than by translation.
Dionysius—Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite: Aquinas refers to the works of Dionysius, whom scholars of the time thought to be the person mentioned in Acts 17:34 (a disciple ofSt. Paul). However, they were most likely written in Syria during the 6th century by a writer who attributed his book to Dionysius (hence the addition of the prefix "pseudo-" to the name "Dionysius" in most modern references to these works).
Rabbi Moses— Rabbi MosesMaimonides: aJewishrabbinicalscholar, a near-contemporary of Aquinas (died 1204, before Aquinas). The scholastics derived many insights from his work, as he also employed thescholastic method.
Graphical depiction of the cyclic structure of the work
St. Thomas's greatest work was theSumma, and it is the fullest presentation of his views. He worked on it from the time ofClement IV(after 1265) until the end of his life. When he died, he had reached Question 90 of Part III (on the subject ofpenance).[9]What was lacking was added afterwards from the fourth book of his commentary on theSentencesofPeter Lombardas asupplementum, which is not found in manuscripts of the 13th and 14th centuries. TheSummawas translated into:Greek(apparently byMaximus Planudesaround 1327) andArmenian; manyEuropean languages; andChinese.[9]
The structure of theSumma Theologiaeis meant to reflect thecyclicnature of the cosmos, in the sense of the emission and return of the Many from and tothe OneinPlatonism, cast in terms of Christian theology: The procession of the material universe fromdivine essence; the culmination of creation inman; and the motion of manback towards Godby way ofChristand theSacraments.[10]
The structure of the work reflects this cyclic arrangement. It begins with God and his existence in Question 2. The entire first part of theSummadeals with God and his creation, which reaches its zenith in man. The First Part, therefore, ends with the treatise on man. The second part of theSummadeals with man's purpose (the meaning of life), which is happiness. The ethics detailed in this part are a summary of the ethics (Aristotelianin nature) that man must follow to reach his intended destiny. Since no man on his own can truly live the perfect ethical life (and therefore reach God), it was necessary that a perfect man bridge the gap between God and man. Thus God became man. The third part of theSumma, therefore, deals with the life of Christ.
In order to follow the way prescribed by this perfect man, in order to live with God's grace (which is necessary for man's salvation), the Sacraments have been provided; the final part of theSummaconsiders the Sacraments.
Theologyis the most certain of all sciences because its source is divine knowledge (which cannot be deceived) and because of the greater worth of its subject matter, the sublimity of which transcendshuman reason.[x]
When a man knows an effect and knows that it has a cause, the natural desire of the intellect or mind is to understand the essence of that thing. This understanding is necessary for the perfection of the intellect.[xi]
The existence of something and its essence are distinct (e.g., a mountain of solid gold would have essence, since it can be imagined, but not existence, since it is not in the world). More precisely, thebeingof something, and man's conception/imagination of such, are separate in all things—except for God, who issimple.[xii]
Human reasoning alone can prove: theexistence of God;His total simplicityor lack of composition; hiseternal nature(i.e., He exists outside of time, as time is held to be a part of God's created universe); His knowledge; the way Hiswilloperates; and His power. However, although St. Thomas felt that human reason alone could prove that God created the universe, reason alone could not determine whether the universe was eternal or actually began at some point in time. Rather, onlydivine revelationfrom theBook of Genesisproves that.[xiii][xiv]
All statements about God are eitheranalogicalormetaphorical: one cannot say man is "good" in exactly the same sense as God, but rather that he imitates in some way the simple nature of God in being good, just, or wise.[xv]
'Unbelief' is the worstsinin the realm of morals.[xvi]
Collectingintereston loans is forbidden, because it is charging people twice for the same thing.[xx]
In and of itself, selling a thing for more or less than what it is worth is unlawful (thejust pricetheory).[xxi]
The contemplative life is greater than the active life.[xxii]What is even greater is the contemplative life that takes action to call others to the contemplative life and give them the fruits of contemplation.[xxiii](This actually was the lifestyle of theDominicanfriars, of which St. Thomas was a member.)
Both monks and bishops are in a state ofperfection.[xxiv]Being amonkis greater than beingmarriedand even greater (in many ways) than being apriest, but it is not as good as being abishop.
Although theJewsdelivered Christ to die, it was theGentileswho killed him, foreshadowing howsalvationwould begin with the Jews and spread to the Gentiles.[xxv]
After theend of the world(in which all living material will be destroyed), the world will be composed of non-living matter (e.g. rocks), but it will be illuminated or enhanced in beauty by the fires of theapocalypse; a new heaven and earth will be established.[xxvi]
Martyrs, teachers of the faith (doctors), andvirgins, in that order, receive special crowns inheavenfor their achievements.[xxvii]
"The physicist proves the Earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e. g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e. g. by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center."[xxviii]
The first part of theSummais summed up in the premise thatGodgoverns the world as the "universalfirst cause". God sways the intellect; he gives the power to know and impresses thespecies intelligibileson the mind, and he sways the will in that he holds the good before it as aim, creating thevirtus volendi. "To will is nothing else than a certain inclination toward the object of the volition which is the universal good." God works all in all, but so that things also themselves exert their proper efficiency. Here theAreopagiticideas of the graduated effects of created things play their part in St. Thomas's thought.[9]
Part I treats of God, who is the "first cause, himself uncaused" (primum movensimmobile) and as such existent only in act (actu)—i.e. pure actuality without potentiality, and therefore without corporeality. His essence isactus purus et perfectus. Thisfollows fromthe fivefold proof for the existence of God; namely, there must be a first mover, unmoved, a first cause in the chain of causes, an absolutely necessary being, an absolutely perfect being, and a rational designer. In this connection the thoughts of the unity,infinity, unchangeability, and goodness of the highest being are deduced.
As God rules in the world, the "plan of the order of things" preexists in him; in other words, hisprovidenceand the exercise of it in his government are what condition as cause everything which comes to pass in the world. Hence followspredestination: from eternity some are destined to eternal life, while as concerns others "he permits some to fall short of that end".Reprobation, however, is more than mere foreknowledge; it is the "will of permitting anyone to fall into sin and incur the penalty of condemnation for sin".
The effect of predestination is grace. Since God is the first cause of everything, he is the cause of even the free acts of men through predestination. Determinism is deeply grounded in the system of St. Thomas; things (with their source of becoming in God) are ordered from eternity as means for the realization of his end in himself.
On moral grounds, St. Thomas advocates freedom energetically; but, with his premises, he can have in mind only the psychological form of self-motivation. Nothing in the world is accidental or free, although it may appear so in reference to the proximate cause. From this point of view, miracles become necessary in themselves and are to be considered merely as inexplicable to man. From the point of view of the first cause, all is unchangeable, although from the limited point of view of the secondary cause, miracles may be spoken of.
In his doctrine of theTrinity, Aquinas starts from the Augustinian system. Since God has only the functions of thinking and willing, only twoprocessionescan be asserted from the Father; but these establish definite relations of the persons of the Trinity, one to another. The relations must be conceived as real and not as merely ideal; for, as with creatures relations arise through certain accidents, since in God there is no accident but all is substance, it follows that "the relation really existing in God is the same as the essence according to the thing". From another side, however, the relations as real must be really distinguished one from another. Therefore, three persons are to be affirmed in God.
Man stands opposite to God; he consists ofsouland body. The "intellectual soul" consists ofintellectandwill. Furthermore, the soul is the absolutely indivisible form of man; it is immaterial substance, but not one and the same in all men (as theAverroistsassumed). The soul's power of knowing has two sides: a passive (theintellectus possibilis) and an active (theintellectus agens).
It is the capacity to form concepts and to abstract the mind's images (species) from the objects perceived by sense; but since what the intellect abstracts from individual things is universal, the mind knows the universal primarily and directly and knows the singular only indirectly by virtue of a certainreflexio(cf.Scholasticism). As certain principles are immanent in the mind for its speculative activity, so also a "special disposition of works"—or thesynderesis(rudiment of conscience)—is inborn in the "practical reason", affording the idea of the moral law of nature so important in medieval ethics.
The second part of theSummafollows this complex of ideas. Its theme is man's striving for the highest end, which is the blessedness of thevisio beata. Here, St. Thomas develops his system of ethics, which has its root inAristotle.
In a chain of acts of will, man strives for the highest end. They are free acts, insofar as man has in himself the knowledge of their end (and therein the principle of action). In that the will wills the end, it wills also the appropriate means, chooses freely and completes theconsensus. Whether the act is good or evil depends on the end. The "human reason" pronounces judgment concerning the character of the end; it is, therefore, the law for action. Human acts, however, are meritorious insofar as they promote the purpose of God and his honor.
By repeating a good action, man acquires a moral habit or a quality that enables him to do the good gladly and easily. This is true, however, only of the intellectual and moral virtues (which St. Thomas treats after the manner ofAristotle); the theological virtues are imparted by God to man as a "disposition", from which the acts here proceed; while they strengthen, they do not form it. The "disposition" of evil is the opposite alternative.
An act becomes evil through deviation from the reason and from divine moral law. Therefore, sin involves two factors:
its substance (or matter) is lust; and
its form is deviation from the divine law.
Sinhas its origin in the will, which decides (against reason) for a "changeable good". Since, however, the will also moves the other powers of man, sin has its seat in these too. By choosing such a lower good as its end, the will is misled by self-love, so that this works as cause in every sin. God is not the cause of sin since, on the contrary, he draws all things to himself; but from another side, God is the cause of all things, so he is efficacious also in sin asactiobut not asens.The devil is not directly the cause of sin, but he incites the imagination and the sensuous impulse of man (as men or things may also do).
Sin isoriginal sin. Adam's first sin passes through himself to all the succeeding race; because he is the head of the human race and "by virtue of procreation human nature is transmitted and along with nature its infection." The powers of generation are, therefore, designated especially as "infected". The thought is involved here by the fact that St. Thomas, like other scholastics, believed increationism; he therefore taught that souls are created by God.
Two things, according to St. Thomas, constituted man's righteousness in paradise:
thejustitia originalis('original justice'), i.e., the harmony of all man's powers before they were blighted by desire; and
the possession of thegratis gratum faciens(the continuous, indwelling power of good).
Both are lost through original sin, which, in form, is the "loss of original righteousness". The consequence of this loss is the disorder and maiming of man's nature, which shows itself in "ignorance; malice, moral weakness, and especially inconcupiscentia,which is the material principle of original sin." The course of thought here is as follows: when the first man transgressed the order of his nature appointed by nature and grace, he (and with him the human race) lost this order. This negative state is the essence of original sin. From it follow an impairment and perversion of human nature in which thenceforth lower aims rule, contrary to nature, and release the lower element in man.
Since sin is contrary to the divine order, it is guilt and subject to punishment. Guilt and punishment correspond to each other; and since the "apostasy from the invariable good which is infinite," fulfilled by man, is unending, it merits everlasting punishment.
God works even in sinners to draw them to the end by "instructing through the law and aiding by grace." The law is the "precept of the practical reason". As the moral law of nature, it is the participation of the reason in the all-determining "eternal reason"; but since man falls short in his appropriation of this law of reason, there is need of a "divine law"; and since the law applies to many complicated relations, thepracticae dispositionesof the human law must be laid down.
The divine law consists of an old and a new. Insofar as the old divine law contains the moral law of nature, it is universally valid; what there is in it, however, beyond this is valid only for the Jews. The new law is "primarily grace itself" and so a "law given within"; "a gift superadded to nature by grace", but not a "written law". In this sense, as sacramental grace, the new law justifies. It contains, however, an "ordering" of external and internal conduct and so regarded is, as a matter of course, identical with both the old law and the law of nature. Theconsiliashow how one may attain the end "better and more expediently" by full renunciation of worldly goods.
Since man is sinner and creature, he needs grace to reach the final end. The "first cause" alone is able to reclaim him to the "final end". This is true after the fall, although it was needful before. Grace is, on one side, "the free act of God", and, on the other side, the effect of this act, thegratia infusaorgratia creata,ahabitus infususthat is instilled into the "essence of the soul... a certain gift of disposition, something supernatural proceeding from God into man." Grace is a supernatural ethical character created in man by God, which comprises in itself all good, both faith and love.
"the influencing of free will toward God through faith";
the influencing of free will respecting sin"; and
"the remission of sins".
Grace is a "transmutation of the human soul" that takes place "instantaneously". A creative act of God enters, which executes itself as a spiritual motive in a psychological form corresponding to the nature of man.Semi-pelagiantendencies are far removed from St. Thomas. In that man is created anew, he believes and loves, and now, sin is forgiven. Then begins good conduct; grace is the "beginning of meritorious works". Aquinas conceives of merit in the Augustinian sense: God gives the reward for that toward which he himself gives the power. Man can never of himself deserve theprima gratis, normeritum de congruo(by natural ability; cf. R. Seeberg,Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, ii. 105–106, Leipsic, 1898).
After thus stating the principles of morality, in theSecunda Secundae,St. Thomas comes to a minute exposition of his ethics according to the scheme of the virtues. The conceptions of faith and love are of much significance in the complete system of St. Thomas. Man strives toward thehighest goodwith the will or through love; but since the end must first be "apprehended in the intellect", knowledge of the end to be loved must precede love; "because the will can not strive after God in perfect love unless the intellect have true faith toward him."
Inasmuch as this truth that is to be known is practical, it first incites the will, which then brings the reason to "assent"; but since, furthermore, the good in question is transcendent and inaccessible to man by himself, it requires the infusion of a supernatural "capacity" or "disposition" to make man capable of faith as well as love.
Accordingly, the object of both faith and love is God, involving also the entire complex of truths and commandments that God reveals, insofar as they in fact relate to God and lead to him. Thus, faith becomes recognition of the teachings and precepts of the Scriptures and the Church ("the first subjection of man to God is by faith"). The object of faith, however, is, by its nature, object of love; therefore, faith comes to completion only in love ("by love is the act of faith accomplished and formed").
Law is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.
— Summa Theologica, Pt. II-II, Q. 90, Article 4
All law comes from the eternal law of Divine Reason that governs the universe, which is understood and participated in by rational beings (such as men andangels) as thenatural law. The natural law, when codified and promulgated, islex humana('human law').[viii]
In addition to the human law, dictated by reason, man also has the divine law, which, according to Question 91, is dictated through revelation, that man may be "directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end", "that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid", because "human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts", and since "human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse." Human law is not all-powerful; it cannot govern a man'sconscience, nor prohibit all vices, nor can it force all men to act according to its letter, rather than its spirit.
Furthermore, it is possible that an edict can be issued without any basis in law as defined in Question 90; in this case, men are under no compulsion to act, save as it helps the common good. This separation between law and acts of force also allows men to deposetyrants, or those who flout thenatural law; while removing an agent of the law is contrary to the common good and the eternal law of God, which orders the powers that be, removing a tyrant is lawful as he has ceded his claim to being a lawful authority by acting contrary to law.
The way which leads to God isChrist, the theme of Part III. It can be asserted that theincarnationwas absolutely necessary. TheUniobetween theLogosand the human nature is a "relation" between the divine and the human nature, which comes about by both natures being brought together in the one person of the Logos. An incarnation can be spoken of only in the sense that the human nature began to be in the eternal hypostasis of the divine nature. So Christ isunumsince his human nature lacks thehypostasis.
The person of the Logos, accordingly, has assumed the impersonal human nature, and in such way that the assumption of the soul became the means for the assumption of the body. This union with the human soul is thegratia unionis, which leads to the impartation of thegratia habitualisfrom the Logos to the human nature. Thereby, all human potentialities are made perfect in Jesus. Besides the perfections given by the vision of God, which Jesus enjoyed from the beginning, he receives all others by thegratia habitualis. Insofar, however, as it is the limited human nature which receives these perfections, they are finite. This holds both of the knowledge and the will of Christ.
The Logos impresses thespecies intelligibilesof all created things on the soul, but theintellectus agenstransforms them gradually into the impressions of sense. On another side, the soul of Christ works miracles only as instrument of the Logos, since omnipotence in no way appertains to this human soul in itself. Concerning redemption, St. Thomas teaches that Christ is to be regarded as redeemer after his human nature but in such way that the human nature produces divine effects as organ of divinity.
The one side of the work of redemption consists herein, that Christ as head of humanity impartsordo,perfectio, andvirtusto his members. He is the teacher and example of humanity; his whole life and suffering as well as his work after he is exalted serve this end. The love wrought hereby in men effects, according to Luke vii. 47, the forgiveness of sins.
This is the first course of thought. Then follows a second complex of thoughts, which has the idea of satisfaction as its center. To be sure, God as the highest being could forgive sins without satisfaction; but because his justice and mercy could be best revealed through satisfaction, he chose this way. As little, however, as satisfaction is necessary in itself, so little does it offer an equivalent, in a correct sense, for guilt; it is rather a "superabundant satisfaction", since on account of the divine subject in Christ in a certain sense his suffering and activity are infinite.
With this thought, the strict logical deduction ofAnselm'stheory is given up. Christ's suffering bore personal character in that it proceeded "out of love and obedience". It was an offering brought to God, which as a personal act had the character of merit. Thereby, Christ "merited" salvation for men. As Christ, exalted, still influences men, so does he still work on their behalf continually in heaven through the intercession (interpellatio).
In this way, Christ as head of humanity effects the forgiveness of their sins, their reconciliation with God, their immunity from punishment, deliverance from the devil, and the opening of heaven's gate; but inasmuch as all these benefits are already offered through the inner operation of the love of Christ, Aquinas has combined the theories of Anselm andAbelardby joining the one to the other.
The doctrine of thesacramentsfollows the Christology; the sacraments "have efficacy from the incarnate Word himself". They are not only signs of sanctification, but also bring it about. It is inevitable that they bring spiritual gifts in sensuous form, because of the sensuous nature of man. Theres sensibilesare the matter, the words of institution the form of the sacraments. Contrary to the Franciscan view that the sacraments are mere symbols whose efficacy God accompanies with a directly following creative act in the soul, St. Thomas holds it not unfit to agree withHugo of St. Victorthat "a sacrament contains grace", or to teach that they "cause grace".
St. Thomas attempts to remove the difficulty of a sensuous thing producing a creative effect, by distinguishing between thecausa principalis et instrumentalis. God, as the principal cause, works through the sensuous thing as the means ordained by him for his end. "Just as instrumental power is acquired by the instrument from this, that it is moved by the principal agent, so also the sacrament obtains spiritual power from the benediction of Christ and the application of the minister to the use of the sacrament. There is spiritual power in the sacraments in so far as they have been ordained by God for a spiritual effect." This spiritual power remains in the sensuous thing until it has attained its purpose. At the same time, St. Thomas distinguished thegratia sacramentalisfrom thegratia virtutum et donorum, in that the former perfects the general essence and the powers of the soul, whilst the latter in particular brings to pass necessary spiritual effects for the Christian life. Later, this distinction was ignored.
In a single statement, the effect of thesacramentsis to infuse justifying grace into men. That which Christ effects is achieved through the sacraments. Christ's humanity was the instrument for the operation of his divinity; the sacraments are the instruments through which this operation of Christ's humanity passes over to men. Christ's humanity served his divinity asinstrumentum conjunctum, like the hand; the sacraments areinstrumenta separata, like a staff; the former can use the latter, as the hand can use a staff. (For a more detailed exposition, cf. Seeberg,ut sup., ii. 112 sqq.)
Of St. Thomas's eschatology, according to the commentary on theSentences, this is only a brief account. Everlasting blessedness consists in the vision of God – this vision consists not in an abstraction or in a mental image supernaturally produced, but the divine substance itself is beheld, and in such manner that God himself becomes immediately the form of the beholding intellect. God is the object of the vision and, at the same time, causes the vision.
The perfection of the blessed also demands that the body be restored to the soul as something to be made perfect by it. Since blessedness consists inoperatio,it is made more perfect in that the soul has a definiteoperatiowith the body, although the peculiar act of blessedness (in other words, the vision of God) has nothing to do with the body.
Early partial editions were printed still in the15th century, as early as 1463; an edition of the first section of part 2 was printed byPeter Schöfferof Mainz in 1471.[11]A full edition was printed by Michael Wenssler of Basel in 1485.[12]From the 16th century, numerous commentaries on theSummawere published, notably byPeter Crockaert(d. 1514),Francisco de Vitoriaand byThomas Cajetan(1570).
1663.Summa totius theologiae(Ordinis Praedicatorumed.), edited by Gregorio Donati (d. 1642)
1852–73. Parma edition. Opera Omnia, Parma: Fiaccadori.
1871–82. Vivès edition. Opera Omnia, Paris: Vivès.
1886. Editio altera romana, edited byPope Leo XIII. Forzani, Rome.[13]
The most accessible English translation of the work is that originally published by Benziger Brothers, in five volumes, in 1911 (with a revised edition published in 1920).
The translation is entirely the work of Laurence Shapcote (1864-1947), an English Dominican friar. Wanting to remain anonymous, however, he attributed the translation to the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Father Shapcote also translated various of Aquinas's other works.[15]
1886–1892.Die katholische Wahrheit oder die theologische Summa des Thomas von Aquin(in German), translated by C.M Schneider. Regensburg: G. J. Manz.[16]
1911.The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York:Benzinger Brothers.
1920.The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas(revised ed.). London: Benzinger Brothers.[17]
1947. (reissue, 3 vols.) New York: Benzinger Brothers.[18]
1964–80. Blackfriars edition (61 vols., Latin and English with notes and introductions, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, and New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company), paperback edition 2006 (ISBN9780521690485).
1989.Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation, T. McDermott. London:Eyre & Spottiswoode.
^Summa Theologica, Pt. II-II, Q. 10, Art. 3. Retrieved 11 July 2006. However, at other points, Aquinas, with different meanings of "great" makes the claim for pride, despair, and hatred of God.
^로스, 제임스 F. 2003. "토마스 아퀴나스, 'Summa theologiae'(ca. 1273), 철학적으로 설명되는 기독교 지혜." p. 165 서양철학의 고전: 독자 가이드,J. J. E. Gracia, G. M. Reichberg, B. N. Schumacher 편집. 옥스포드: 블랙웰 출판.ISBN9780631236115.
^페리에, 조셉 루이스. 1909. "19 세기 스콜라 철학의 부흥." 뉴욕:컬럼비아 대학 출판부. 149쪽.
^길슨, 에티엔 (1994).성 토마스 아퀴나스의 기독교 철학. 노트르담, IN: 노트르담 대학 출판부. 피. 502.ISBN978-0-268-00801-7.
^토렐, 장 피에르. 1996.SaintThomas Aquinas, vol 1, The Person and His Work,Robert Royal 번역. 가톨릭 대학교. 146 ff.
^"성 토마스 아퀴나스는 Averroes의 "그랜드 논평"을 그의 모델로 사용했으며, 분명히 그 스타일의 박람회를 채택한 최초의 스콜라 학자였습니다..." 터너, 윌리엄. 1907. "아베로에스."가톨릭 백과 사전2. 뉴욕 : 로버트 애플턴 컴퍼니. 2009년 11월 6일에 확인함.
^"Thomas Aquinas의 'Summa Theologiae': A Guide and Commentary" by Brian Davies [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. xiv]. 1917년부터 사망할 때까지 Shapcote는남아프리카공화국나탈 주에기반을 두고 있었습니다. 퍼거스 커, "샤프코트 번역",뉴 블랙프라이어스(2011년 8월),doi:10.1111/j.1741-2005.2011.01454.x.
토마스 아퀴나스(1952), edd. Walter Farrell,OP, Martin J. Healy,My Way of Life : St. Thomas의 포켓 에디션 - 모든 사람을위한 단순화 된 Summa, Brooklyn : Confraternity of the Precious Blood.
